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1. Introduction: from post-war period to the economic miracle 
 
At the end of  World War II, Italy was a country to be reconstructed. Although the economy was 
not merely agricultural or subsistence, a significant part of  the production system had been destroyed by 
the conflict. Half  a century later, the same country ranks among top global economies.  
A great array of  factors - distributed in time - drove this change. The starting point of  this 
transformation was the signing of  Marshall Plan (1948) and the following "economic miracle", which 
can be dated between the fifties and the sixties. The economic boom took place as a consequence of  
such recovery program (allowing means of  production and know-how flows), of  economic policies 
based on State participation, and of  export-oriented strategies - exploiting the low cost of  labor due to 
high unemployment levels (10% in 1953-54). As a result, from 1950 to 1963 real GDP average growth 
rate was about 6% per year, while unemployment rate reached its historic lowest bound in 1963 (3.7%). 
Furthermore, an increase in labor productivity - combined with low bargaining power of  workers,  
experienced after the split of  the unitary trade union (1948) - was observed in all regional areas: this led 
to a rise in profits greater than wages growth. 
 
Based on these starting points, the aim of  this paper is to provide an overview of  Italian economic 
trends, and to relate them - where possible - to the implementation of  labor market reforms. To this 
purpose, we organised this essay as follows. In Section 2, the paper aims to analyse economic growth, 
focusing on links with productivity indicators, and providing a comparison between two different 
economic theoretical approaches. In Section 3 we explore the income wage share, and we connect it to 
employment trends, in order to assess the Marxian theory of  distribution. Section 4 shows some 
empirical evidence about “gap” between labor productivity and real wages, related to main labor market 
reforms. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2. The doubtful link between productivity and growth 
 
In this section we focus on the analysis of  macroeconomic indicators such as GDP at 2005 
constant prices1, per capita GDP and labor productivity from 1960 until 2012. After a brief  description 
of  Italian economic development, we try to link these indicators to labor productivity issue, stressing this 
puzzling point through two distinct approaches. 
 
Annual average growth rate 1960-73 1974-83 1984-93 1994-07 2008-12 
GDP 5,37% 2,82% 2,32% 1,67% -1,40% 
GDP per employee (GDP/Lt) 5,65% 2,16% 1,95% 0,78% -0,99% 
GDP per capita (GDP/pop) 4,67% 2,48% 2,27% 1,47% -1,76% 
 
Table_1 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations on 2005 constant prices data 
                                                           
1 In regard to this indicator, see methodological annex. 
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As you can see in Table_1, we divide our analysis into five sub-periods. As a matter of  fact, the average 
annual GDP growth rate is constantly decreasing: during the sixties, output was growing at an average 
annual rate greater than 6%, while in the following terms data show a lower dynamic - halved growth 
rates in the following decade. Indeed, in the last five-year period real growth became negative, partially 
due to the financial crash (started in 2007). According to these indicators, we can argue Italian economy 
experienced significant changes in recent decades, and they were not achieved in the willing direction: 
per capita real income (in absolute terms) is even reduced in the last years. To these matters are related 
all economic issues about the long-term effects of  the crisis on variables such as income, aggregate 
demand and employment. The slowdown in GDP dynamic is worth considering in order to avoid the 
decline both in absolute and relative terms of  Italian economy. However, some reasons of  this 
phenomenon don’t seem to be only recent: observing real output trend we can easily conclude that weak 
national income growth takes particular evidence during the seventies. 
 
First of  all, we consider this trend as the result of  a double issue. On one hand, it is attributable to 
restrictive monetary policies, carried out in order to stem inflation; on the other hand, it is due to 
measures limiting exchange rates fluctuation through the introduction of  the “currency snake” (1972) - a 
prelude to the European Monetary System - as a result of  Bretton Woods system collapse (occurred in 
1971). The decay of  these agreements provided for the abolition of  fixed exchange rates regime between 
European currencies and US dollar, as well as the dollar-peg to gold. In order to amend the “currency 
mayhem” created by the US monetary system, in 1972 European countries signed the Basel Accords, 
instituting a 2.25% fluctuation range between each national currency, and keeping a swinging band 
against dollar at 4.5% [Gauthier, 1998]. With respect to Italy, exchange rate stability with Europe meant 
levelling inflation dynamics compared to foreign countries through restrictive monetary policies (see 
Graph_1). 
 
 
Graph_1 – Source: Ameco time series (authors’ elaborations) 
4 
 
However, inflationary pressure on Western economies caused by the first oil crisis (1973) 
overwhelmed this monetary stability system. Imported inflation - due to the increase of  crude oil price – 
caused large instability in exchange rates, which led many European currencies to leave the “currency 
snake” - including Italy, gone out in 1973, then directly joined European Monetary System in 1979. In 
order to contain high inflation, Italian central bank implemented restrictive monetary policies by raising 
nominal short-term interest rates. As you can seen in Graph_1, during the 70’s and the ‘80s interest rates 
were kept exceptionally high in order to limit money demand: these monetary measures (together with 
worsening growth expectations) led to a slowdown in investment and consumption2. Indeed, the average 
growth rates of  investment and consumption (see Table_2) are strictly decreasing compared to the 60’s: 
negative investments growth rates3 were experienced in 1975, from 1981 to 1983 and in 1992-93 
biennium. Furthermore, in Table_3 you can see as investments per worker show a decreasing growth 
rate overtime. 
 
Annual average growth rates 1960-73 1974-83 1984-93 1994-07 2008-12 
Households consumption 5,94% 2,87% 2,50% 1,57% -1,05% 
Gross investments 5,03% 0,86% 1,71% 2,77% -5,07% 
Government’s expenditure 4,07% 3,40% 1,97% 1,06% -0,58% 
Export 10,31% 5,11% 5,20% 4,63% -0,15% 
 
Table_2 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations on 2005 constant prices data 
 
A second factor of  growth delay can be found in weak labor productivity increases. Especially 
during the 80’s, a fervent debate emerged about growth differential between Europe and USA [Birolo, 
2010], owing to the old continent was recording low growth rates in income and employment, while 
USA were experiencing high economic prosperity. Economic literature explains these gaps along two 
distinct approaches: the first one focuses on the so-called supply factors, while the second one refers to the 
Verdoorn law [1949], providing a stable positive relationship between labor productivity and output 
growth rate, hence insisting on demand factors.  
 
Following the “first theoretical approach”, this differential is often explained by human and social 
capital low endowments, by the lack of  R&D investments4, and by markets framework, rigidity and 
distortion [Ofria, 2009]. Moreover, the burden of  low economic growth is attributable to weak 
productivity dynamics, mainly due to alleged problems of  labor market flexibility [Parascandolo & 
Sgarra, 2005]. Especially, it is argued that regulation of  economic activity negatively affects the level of  
productivity, and therefore output level. In essence, in case of  strong economic regulation productivity 
                                                           
2 Between nominal short-term interest rate and real GDP growth rate (1970-1993) there is a -0.55 Pearson correlation. 
3 Following an alternative approach, if  investments are financed through creation of  endogenous money supply, such a decrease could be 
ascribed to the lack of  credit demand by enterprises, or else to banking credit crunch; referring to these years, data show negative real 
interest rates (i.e. nominal interest rate less inflation rate): according to this line of  reasoning, we can argue banks didn’t grant credit because 
of  such a similar operation could led to actual losses. Moreover, since 1973 administrative credit controls were established, and since 1976 - 
after a currency crisis - ceilings on lending were raised; credit restrictions were intended to increase the effectiveness of  restrictive measures 
already implemented after the oil shocks (for further details: www.bancaditalia.it/bancaditalia/storia/anni50/la_turbolenza). 
4 In this framework, it is useful to mention that technological change could foster investment demand, and that investments themselves 
have a direct/prompt effect on aggregate demand [Cesaratto & al., 2003]. 
5 
 
will decrease; conversely, the action of  weak restrictions leads to an increase of  productivity growth rate 
- and therefore to increases in GDP. In this framework, such a tightened regulation results in shifting 
upwards enterprises cost function and downwards production boundary, limiting de facto economy 
growth rate [North, 1990; Aghion & al., 2001]. In these analyses, labor market plays a key role since a 
strict regulatory framework may adversely affect productivity dynamic [Scarpetta & al., 2002]. In 
particular, it is asserted that labor market is based on general economic equilibrium laws, than any 
misalignment will be eliminated by adjustments in real wage. Indeed, in a perfectly competitive market, 
unemployment - intended as an excess in labor supply compared to its demand - is automatically 
absorbed through reduction in actual wages. In this framework, labor market liberalisation would push 
down real wages and therefore total costs function. In the meanwhile, more flexibility would lead to an 
increase in efficiency of  each worker, who perceiving less legal protections would be more productive5, 
therefore shifting upwards the production frontier. In a nutshell, this approach claims that an increase in 
labor productivity would led to an increase in GDP growth rate. In other words, this argument follows a 
clear-cut logical chain: supply-side investments in social and human capital - combined with a greater labor 
market flexibility - lead to lower costs and greater efficiency, which in turn result in a deeper productivity 
growth rate, and therefore in a greater (whole) economy rate of  growth. However, it appears 
immediately obvious that analysing (and modelling) growth under this theoretical standpoint, several 
economists completely ignore the key role of  aggregate demand. 
 
In the light of  the foregoing, we can draw the “second theoretical approach” guidelines observing 
labor productivity from a demand-side perspective. Supporting this line of  thought means that low 
productivity levels are due to low aggregate demand growth [Soro, 2006], caused by a low growth of  its 
components (i.e. households consumption, private investments, exports and government expenditure): 
this effect takes place through an increase in the whole production, which leads to an increase in labor 
productivity. In this framework, in contrast with the “first theoretical approach”, logical chain is 
overturned: it is total output dynamic - depending on aggregate demand [Keynes, 1936] - that positively 
affects labor productivity growth. However, an increase in total production (induced by greater aggregate 
demand) should decrease the level of  unemployment by increasing employees. Especially, the increase in 
actual workers combined with a growing demand could show an indeterminate result on labor 
productivity: if  the increase of  employees is greater than the increase in total output, labor productivity 
will decrease; if  aggregate demand grows as fast as employment, productivity will remain steady; finally, 
labor productivity will rise in case of  aggregate demand grows more than total employees. Following this 
argument, only high capital intensity goods (i.e. given technical conditions of  production, goods 
characterised by an high level of  means of  production per worker) will lead to an increase in 
productivity through aggregate demand expansion. Notwithstanding under a theoretical standpoint 
results on labor productivity could be indeterminate, an empirical evidence - well-known as Okun law 
                                                           
5 However, we are not defining an accurate causal relationship: we consider it as a “mere link”, often referred in order to “implying that 
countries with lower employment protections (...) would record a deepening labor productivity dynamic”. Based on these arguments, policy 
choices are aimed to "reducing employment protections, increasing labor flexibility, focusing on wage flexibility, in order to achieve higher 
labor productivity and thus higher competitiveness of  enterprises in the markets” [Pini, 2013, our translation]. 
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We should like to emphasise that the level of  productivity (expressed as gross value added per 
employee) can be seen as the result from different combinations of  two factors. Referring to this 
factorisation, efficiency increases achieved through strictu sensu productivity gains (value added per hour 
worked) tend to be more stable than increases obtained through increasing hours worked per employee. 
This happens because of  capacity utilisation - considered as annual hours worked per employee - can 
grow quickly during cyclical expansions, as well as it sharply decreases during recessions. The empirical 
evidence suggests that Italy may have experienced such a similar phenomenon during last two decades: 
labor market reforms have been introduced in order to increase employment flexibility, leading 
companies to increase the number of  employees, although "without commitments in favor of  
investment and technological innovation" [Travaglini, 2013, our translation]. As well as a reduced 
working time - due to a greater labor market flexibility - at the outbreak of  financial crisis (2007) 
companies chose to dismiss most recent employees (mainly temporary workers), with an evident impact 
on unemployment. In addition to these issues, the analysis of  annual hours worked per employee allows 
further considerations about the degree of  capacity utilisation [Garegnani, 1992; Trezzini, 1995]. In 
particular, the fall in GDP growth rate - from 1970 to 1979 on 4% average per year - or alternatively in 
value added, produced a reduction in hours worked per employee. From 1980 to 1999 (plotted in 
Graph_3 between dashed lines) average GDP growth rate is about 2%, while annual hours worked per 
employee remain fairly stable. Subsequently, since 2000 GDP has been growing on average by 0.4% per 
year, with an important reduction in hours worked per employee. This process allows us to understand 
firms behaviour: during cyclical phases of  falling aggregate demand growth rate, firms do not decrease 
proportionally employment, but they reduce capacity utilisation degree. In this way, firms de facto reduce 
voluntarily hours worked per employees, keeping in their disposal additional production capacity in order 
to react quickly in case of  increasing aggregate demand. The willingness of  enterprises to face enhanced 
aggregate demand in a timely manner makes labor market less flexible than other markets. 
 
 
3. Distributive shares, wages and employment trends 
 
As argued, wages and productivity dynamics played a key role in determining Italian economic trend. 
However, we claim these issues are not merely related to labour market reforms. Especially, also actual 
unemployment could affect wage dynamic. To this purpose - and in order to verify the Marxian theory 
of  distribution for the Italian case - in this section we analyse distributive shares and real wages. In a 
nutshell, we aim to estimate the relationship between changes in wages (or distributive shares) and 
unemployment. 
As a matter of  fact, distributive shares - amount of  national income up to workers, entrepreneurs 
and rentiers - show wide fluctuations across countries. These changes call into question the stylized fact 
[Kaldor, 1957] of  stable distributive shares over time, through adjustments occurred as result of  changes 
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employees, also considering increasing wage earners (see Table_4). This change, combined with a low 
economic growth, bring about a low growth rate in total employment, and consequently an increase in 
unemployment rate, which experienced a 9% average rate from 1984 to 2007. 
 
Some authors argue this significant decline in labor income share could be referred to a couple of  
factors. The first one (occurred during the ’80s) is related to a feasible adjustment mechanism towards 
equilibrium. The second one (occurred during the ‘90s) is explainable as the result of  changes in the goods 
and labor market [Torrini, 2010, our translation], which encouraged rents and profits growth - only since 
the 2000s labor share recorded a poor recovery. Following this theoretical framework, total wages grew - 
at the expense of  profits - as a result of  an exogenous acceleration (experienced during the 70’s), 
followed by a contraction in labor demand. Nevertheless, wage share didn’t stop its decrease after it 
completed such hypothetical adjustment process. Contrariwise, wage share fell beyond the level achieved 
at the end of  the sixties. Some authors [Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2003] explain this phenomenon through 
changes in institutional dispositions, arguing that labor market reforms (negatively affecting wages) and 
privatization processes (positively affecting profits and rents) produced a counter-shock on wages, eroding 
labor share11. 
 
Annual average growth rates 1960-73 1974-83 1984-93 1994-07 2008-12 
Labor force12 -0,24% 0,79% 0,62% 0,61% 0,59% 
Total employees (Lt) -0,26% 0,63% 0,37% 0,89% -0,42% 
Wage earners (Ls) 1,18% 0,38% 0,59% 1,15% -0,16% 
Profit Earners13 -3,13% 1,29% -0,22% 0,15% -1,24% 
Unemployment Rate  5,04% 6,72% 8,99% 9,35% 8,40% 
 
Table_4 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations 
 
As argued, from 1981 to 1983 Italian economic growth rate experienced a drastic reduction, 
recording an annual average GDP expansion less than 1%. At the same time, unemployment rate was 
growing, reaching in that 3-year period an average 7.6% (one and half  point more than previous five 
years average). According to mainstream theory, such weak economic performance was due to a low labor 
productivity, related to low labor market flexibility. Following this approach, policy-makers decided to 
reform labor market (1983-84) focusing on liberalisation measures in order to restore previous 
productivity growth rates. In particular, two measures were taken: a preliminary reduction of  wage 
indexation (Scala Mobile system) and the introduction of  atypical/temporary kinds of  work. Besides, 
these reforms will appear rather limited than other measures taken in the following decade. These 
changes resulted in real wages stagnation: during the eighties - and in early nineties - real wages grew at 
                                                           
11 From 1984 to 1993, average annual GDP growth rate was 2,3%, while average annual real wage growth rate was 0,95%, with a 
consequential impact on labor income share. 
12 These data refer to a "full employment workforce”, computed as the sum of  employed and unemployed, referring to unemployment rate 
available data. 
13 To be more precise, these workers should be called "income earners apart from wage earners". Referring to adjusted wage share, profit 
earners are computed as total employees less wage earners (Lt-Ls). 
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0,95% average annual rate; then they settle on negative average growth rates during 1994-2012 (see 
Table_3). 
 
However, considering real wages stagnation as only dependent on labor market, reforms should 
seem quite confined. In fact, positioning in a classical perspective and referring to the Marxian theory of  
real wage determination, it can be stated that unemployment level will affect wage dynamics. Especially, 
the rise of  the industrial reserve army [Marx, 1964] led to a reduction in working class bargaining power, 
pushing down real wage until its subsistence level. From 1980 to 2000, collapse in wage share was due to 
the stagnation of  real wages, as a result of  a constant unemployment rate combined with a 2% average 
annual GDP growth rate (see Table_1). During last decade, labor share on national income has remained 
flat, owing to both a slight decline in real wages and a weak increase in employment (the average 
unemployment rate from 2000 to 2012 is 8%). Analysing this data14 and considering a decreasing profit 
share experienced during the same period, a strong increase in rents share is clearly demonstrated 
[Torrini, 2010]. 
 
In order to investigate wage dynamics, we decided to apply available data to the model suggested 
by Anwar Shaikh15 [2013]. According to the Marxian theory of  unemployment, this approach argue that 
workers and firms contend for social product through the class conflict. In this framework, the level of  
unemployment affects changes in real wage, and therefore labor share. Since higher unemployment 
would lead to a worsening workers bargaining power (i.e. ability to advance wage claims) due to the 
increase of  the reserve army, from data analysis we expect a negative relationship between wages growth 
rate - or distributive shares - and unemployment rate. 
This model could be represented through the following equations. Firstly, it is argued that wage per 
worker (w = W/Ls) is a share of  labor productivity (x = GVA/Lt): 
    (1) 
where β represents the "strength" of  the working class. In turn, this latter is considered as a negative 
function of  unemployment rate 
  	 + 	ԑ  (2). 
Expressing equation (1) in growth rates, we have 
   +   (3) 
and the wage share 
 


   (4). 
Replacing equation (1) into (4) and calculating wage share growth rate, we obtain: 
                                                           
14 Adjusted wage share: average value 54,27% (2000/2012) – Max 55,73% (2009) – Min 53,23% (2001). 
15 This paper was presented at “Centro di ricerche e documentazioni Piero Sraffa” (Università degli Studi Roma Tre) on November, 29th, 2013. 
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  		 + 	ԑ  (5). 
In addition, assuming constant growth rates of  productivity and of  labor supply16 [Goodwin, 1967] we 
can obtain - by equations (4) and (5) - the following relationship: 
  		 + 	ԑ  (6), 
showing as changes in real wage depend on unemployment rate17. 
 
In detail, Graph_5 plots relationship represented by equation (6), suggesting a negative relationship 
between real wage growth rate and unemployment rate. 
 
 
Graph_5 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations (1961-2012) 
 
As regards the analysis of  equation (5), we observe a relationship consistent with the previous one. In 
Graph_6 we show the relationship between wage share dynamics and unemployment rate from 1961 to 
2012; in addition, in Graph_7 we analyse the same relationship on a shorter period (1970-2012). 
Such a similar change in the slope of  the regression line - observable in Graph_6 and Graph_7 - could 
be due to the introduction of  Workers' Statute (1970), which improved bargaining power of  the working 
class. Feeling "more protected" than during the previous decade, workers were able to "claim" a greater 
                                                           
16 To be more precise, we are considering data about actual employment (i.e. number of  workers annually employed). In this regard, 
referring to “labour demand” could appear more appropriate; anyway, we are complying to Goodwin [1967], whose essay is commonly 
identified as “Real Wage Phillips Curve” approach. 
17 In order to adjust data from economic cycle effects, in all regressions we use a 3-years simple moving average for dependent variables. 
13 
 
share of  the social product. In fact, while during the 60’s the average annual labor share growth rate was 
-0.55%, in the 70’s it settled on 0.57%, despite an actual slowdown in the whole Italian economy (see 
Table_1). 
 
 
Graph_6 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations (1961-2012) 
 
 
Graph_7 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations (1970-2012) 
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4. Labor market reforms: empirical evidences 
 
In addition to unemployment trend, also institutional factors could affect wage dynamic (to be fair, 
reforms could also directly affect unemployment). In this last section, the following ten measures and/or 
historical events will be considered in order to peruse the impact of  labor market reforms on real wages 
and labor productivity trends. 
 
 
I) Law 741/1959 (also known as Vigorelli’s Law): given the rigidity of  Article N.39 of  Italian Constitution – limiting 
legislative power, avoiding application of  collective agreements to workers not joining unions that signed a specific 
agreement – this law aims to assume (as an exception) general effectiveness to collective agreements, which would have 
been applied to all workers of  a particular profession. 
 
II) “Hot Autumn” (1969): after the expiry of  the three-year labor agreements (especially for metalworkers category) 
workers' trade union claims developed, as a consequence of  1968 social-political environment. In terms of  labor law, 
Hot Autumn claims and pressures forced the government to get out from the abstention legislative phase - 
characterising the post-war period as a whole -  adopting Law 300/1970, also known as Workers' Statute. 
 
III) Law 300/1970 (Regulations on protection of  workers freedom and dignity, freedom of  association and trade union activities in the 
workplace and on employment): the introduction of  the Workers’ Statute was intended to change both working conditions and 
relationship among companies, workers and trade unions. The statute, in addition to entitle to employees a set of  
fundamental rights (freedom of  opinion, trade union association, strike, protection in case of  injury/illness), introduced 
job stability guarantees, arranging protections afforded to workers in case of  illegitimate dismissal (Art. 18). 
 
IV) Wage indexation “Scala Mobile” introduction (1975): the contingency allowance was a wage-policy instrument, 
which aims to automatically peg wages to inflation according to consumer price index. It was negotiated in 1975 by 
trade unions and companies (Confindustria), in order to protect real wages (adjusting nominal wages to cost of  living) 
and to maintain the purchasing power of  earnings in case of  price fluctuations. 
 
V) “Scotti Protocol” (1983): this treaty was the result of a triangular agreement on labor costs, signed by 
government, trade unions and Confindustria - after a year and a half of negotiations - in order to contain inflation. Trade 
unions pledged to suspend the supplementary bargaining, while Confindustria unlocked the renewal of contracts whose 
negotiations were suspended. 
 
VI) Wage indexation “Scala Mobile” abolition (1984-1992): a first 4 percentage points curtailment in wage 
indexation took place after Valentine’s agreement (February, 14th, 1984). This measure was confirmed by a referendum 
(promoted by Italian Communist Party in order to revoke wage indexation abolition). Scala Mobile system was finally 
abolished (on July, 31st, 1992) with a triangular agreement signed by government and social partners, abolishing 
permanently the contingency allowance, since this instrument was considered the main cause of price-wage spiral. 
 
VII) “Labor cost agreement” (1993): with the approval of the Government, trade unions and Confindustria signed the 
"Protocol on incomes and employment policy, on contractual arrangements, on labor policies and support to the productive system". In a 
nutshell, it stated: 1) a two-years term for collective agreements; 2) any contract renewal had to take account of 
scheduled inflation, fixed by the government in the budget document (national agreements were aimed to preserve 
purchasing power of wages); 3) at the time of agreement renewals, it was necessary to evaluate the gap between planned 
and actual inflation - experienced during previous two years. 
 
VIII) “Pacchetto Treu” (1997): this term refers to a set of measures “against unemployment” issued by Law 
196/1997. Recognising an already existing reality in Italy, these measures contained dispositions directly regulating 
internship and temporary employment (including the introduction of the apprenticeship contract). Thus, temporary 
work - previously prohibited by law 1369/1960 - became part of the Italian's legal order. 
 IX) “Biagi Reform” (2003): it refers to Law 30/2003 (
market), which introduced a set of innovations widely reforming labor
labor market entry was the best way to facilitate 
of unemployment. This law introduced 
and intermittent contract, accessory/occasional work, 
 
X) “Welfare Protocol” (2007): this document 
employment in a modern and flexible labor market. 
labor relations required by Biagi law in order to counteract 
regulation of temporary contracts, setting 
renewals), then new contracts may be signed
trade unions. 
 
In Graph_8 we analyse the "gap" growth rate
(showed in Graph_2 in their absolute values
order - labor markets reforms, itemised in the previous paragraph and labelled from I to X. It is 
immediate to note - except for a limited number of  periods analysed 
 
Graph_8 – Source: authors’ elaborations
 
First of  all, we have not data on wages
measure on collective bargaining (I, 1959)
Workers’ Statute (III, 1970) appears significant, 
                                                          
18 Graph_8 is based on labor productivity and real wages time series, whence in 
Here, we equal to 100 gross value added per employee and real wage per worker on 1960 
growth rates. 
19 In order to facilitate its interpretation, we remind that real wage growth rate is greater than productivity growth rate when
negative (i.e. below the bold black line), and vice versa
Delegation to the Government in matters of employment and the labor 
 market. According to the legislature, flexibility 
new jobs creation, asserting that system rigidity would create high rates 
(and modified) a set of atypical job contracts (e.g. apprenticeships, job sharing 
project contract), de facto replacing temporary 
included arrangements on labor market about the improvement of 
Furthermore, the protocol reviewed rules governing discontinuous 
atypical work. The most important 
in 36 months the limit of partnership contracts (including extensions and 
 only according to Labor Provincial Directorates 
18 between labor productivity and real wages 
); in parallel with this trend, we point out 
- this "gap" is always positive
 (for further details, see methodological annex)
 and productivity in order to verify the effects
. Instead, the impact on "gap" of  Hot Autumn
highlighting a drop during 1969-70
Graph_2 we calculated their “gap” 
– i.e. initial gap is zero 
. 
15 
in 
- or agency - work. 
measures concerned the 
and with the assistance of 
- in a chronological 
19. 
 
 
 of  the first 
 (II, 1969) and of  
, although only in 1971 
(productivity-wages). 
– and then we calculate gap 
 this indicator is 
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data show an increase in wages higher than productivity growth rate (5.9% vs. 1.8%). Afterwards, 
productivity grew at a higher rate than real wages until 1975, when Scala Mobile (IV) was established: data 
show a fell in productivity (-2%) and an increase in real wages of  three percentage points. During the 
80’s - except for 1981 and for biennium 1989-90 - productivity gains were greater than wage increases, as 
a result of  two prominent events: the Scotti Protocol (V) and the Valentine’s agreement (VI). The latter was a 
prelude to the final abolition of  wage indexation system (Scala Mobile) occurred in 1992, after a couple of  
years (1990/91) characterised by a negative "gap" (for the first time in ten years). 
 
Average annual growth rates 1960-73 1974-83 1984-93 1994-07 2008-12 
Labor productivity (GVA/Lt) 7,43% 2,30% 1,98% 0,78% -0,91% 
Real wages (W/Ls) 5,70% 2,05% 0,95% -0,09% -0,33% 
Gap (Productivity-Wages) 1,72% 0,25% 1,03% 0,87% -0,59% 
 
Table_5 – Source: Ameco time series, authors’ elaborations  
 
Policy-choices fostering labor market flexibility continued to be implemented during the ‘90s. 
Especially, the "gap" remained widely positive during the period 1993/95 as a consequence of  the Labor 
cost agreement (VII, 1993), followed by an additional deregulation measure (VIII, 1997). As a direct result 
of  Pacchetto Treu implementation, "gap" recorded a substantial increase, driven by the collapse of  real 
wages (-4 % in 1998) compared to a productivity stagnation – experienced from 1994 to 2008. At a later 
stage, the Biagi Reform (IX , 2003) was presented as a supplementary measure against labor market 
rigidity, in order to stimulate productivity and employment. Effectively, the Index of  Employment Protection 
(EPL) fell steadily in absolute terms for Italy20, and with greater intensity than other European countries. 
These reforms lead to a reduction in annual hours worked per employee – corroborating the effects of  
Pacchetto Treu (see Graph_3). In addition, these measures fostered the "gap" limiting real wage growth 
rate (+0.5% per year from 2004 to 2007), although earnings dynamics was in line with productivity 
growth rates. 
 
As for the last decade, data are strongly affected by the financial crash began in 2007: productivity 
fell by 4 percentage points in 2009, while decline in real wages was restrained (-2.2%) thanks to the 
effects of  Welfare Protocol (X, 2007). In the last three years of  the analysis, the "gap" does not show a 
regular path: however, despite a substantial recovery in 2010 (see Table_5), during the last five years real 
wages and productivity decreased with similar intensity. 
 
  
                                                           
20 If  we consider version Ept_v1 (incorporating temporary work), this index fell from 5,25 (1985) to 2,00 (2012). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The Italian economy has been characterised by strong expansion during the 60’s and the early 70’s, 
with a 5.5% average annual GDP growth rate. During the mid-seventies, restrictive policies aimed to 
contain imported inflation - in addition to lead Italy to the European Monetary System - bring about an 
initial slowdown in output dynamic. From 1973 to 1984, national income grew at 2.8% average annual 
rate, while labor productivity at 2.3%. This decline could be related to the fall of  investments and export 
growth rates: the former achieved a 0.9% average annual (1974-83) - with an average investment per 
worker growth rate settled on 0.22% - while the latter reached an average rate of  5.10%, halved if  
compared to the previous decade. 
 
At the beginning of  the 80’s, mainstream economists argued that slowdown in GDP growth was 
mainly due to low dynamics in labor productivity. At that time, policy makers attributed this deceleration 
to low labor market flexibility. As a consequence, in order to encourage productivity and to decrease 
unemployment, they suggested a permanent liberalisation process of  labor market. However, from the 
beginning of  the 80’s our survey show these processes led to a slowdown in real wage growth rate, and 
then in labor productivity developments. Furthermore, these policies have not endorsed economic 
activity, as labor productivity has been growing at an ever lower rate. 
From labor market we can also ascertain a persistent unemployment rate, which from 1984 to 2012 
reached an average 9.1% (about 2.5 percentage points more than during the 70’s). Moreover, real wages 
grew at an average annual rate of  1% during the 80’s, and by the mid-90s they showed negative growth 
rates - while labor productivity grew by 2%. In our opinion, the reasons for such performances have to 
be found on theoretical arguments leading policy-makers to consider the productivity issues only related 
to supply-side factors, such as labor market flexibility. Instead, adopting a perspective that takes into 
account the key-role of  aggregate demand – as suggested by Kaldor-Verdoorn approach – labor 
productivity is not only determined by supply-side factors (e.g. social capital, human capital, labor market 
flexibility), but by output dynamics. Endorsing this approach, the causation link between labor 
productivity and GDP is reversed: assuming this view, the low productivity growth rate (experienced 
during the 80’s) is caused by a low growth of  consumption and public expenditure. The former is due to 
a low wage growth rate reducing GDP expansion (and therefore productivity), while the latter is related 
to tight stability constraints required by the European Union, culminating in the recent austerity policies. 
From 1984 to 2007, households consumption growth rate showed an average annual value of  2%, while 
it become negative after 2008. Moreover, during the 80’s - joining to the European Monetary System, 
and especially since 1993 with the signing of  the Maastricht Treaty - data show a decreasing public 
expenditure growth rate, developed at an average annual rate of  1,50 % since the mid-eighties. 
 
To sum up, while productivity dynamics and wage growth are exposed by the “orthodox theory” 
as two related phenomena - considering wage increases possible only in case of  productivity growth - 
following arguments proposed in previous paragraphs, the causal relation is the opposite: through 
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demand expansion (i.e. GDP growth), wage growth can cause productivity gains. In addition to this, 
higher labor market flexibility has not led to a definitive increase in employment, whose trend appears 
still more related to economic cycle. However, the most significant effect of  flexibility is to be found 
elsewhere: companies faced with a new growth opportunity – the so-called "low road" – characterised by 
a reduced cost of  labor (also compared to the cost of  capital). This materialised in a particular corporate 
choice: production was performed “minimising research investment and heavily using executive work, which can be 
exploited through precarious forms of  contract” [Tronti, 2011, our translation]. For these reasons, labor-
intensive techniques were privileged, with a lack of  innovation and technological investments that would 
allow our economy to cope with a demand for upgraded products. This pattern could have enable Italian 
economy to hold together productivity improvements and employment growth – pursuing the so-called 
“high road” 21. Contrariwise, this approach led to low productivity growth rates, since firms used cheap 
labor instead of  implementing investments and innovations that - in addition to impact positively 
aggregate demand22 - would allow product quality increases. These choices reflect the actual Italian 
growth path, characterised by low productivity and a weak competition on product quality, and therefore 
forced to rely on price competition strategies based on wage restraints. 
 
Finally, the analysis carried out on distributive shares and wage trends appears consistent with 
proposed theoretical arguments. The fall in wage growth rate - compared to productivity - has often 
been attributed only to policies aimed labor market liberalisation, combined with changes in institutional 
framework (i.e. privatisation processes). However, our survey shows that real wage growth rate is linked 
both to the flexibility measures and to unemployment trend. The estimation of  the Real Wage Phillips 
Curve allows us to understand that higher unemployment lead to lower wage growth rate, owing to the 
reduction in the bargaining power of  working class. 
  
                                                           
21 «…even in a more globalized economy, there may be alternative paths to successful performance in the international economy - a “low road” that emphasizes cost-
cutting, conflictual labor relations and a narrow set of  social programs, and a “high road” that requires rapid productivity growth and innovation based on 
cooperative labor relations and generally stronger and more centralized labor unions, high quality production and higher wages, as well as greater state-supported 
social protection. (…) The high road/low road terminology is borrowed from Gordon (1996), but the distinction is common in the industrial relations literature. 
Soskice (1990) distinguishes the strategies of  “cost cutting” and “value added”, and Visser (1996) contrasts the “quality scenario” and the “efficiency scenario”» 
[Milberg & Houston, 1999]. 
22 In this framework, in addition to a direct effect on aggregate demand, we must point out that investments have a positive impact on 
productivity strictu sensu (in terms of  higher efficiency) from a supply-side standpoint, as it is assumed that process innovation will shift 
technical condition on the production boundary. 
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METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX 
 
 
1) The whole survey is based on GDP – and per capita GDP – at constant prices time series (1960-
2012) provided by Ameco database, where we also exploited adjusted wage share and gross value added 
data, as well as total employees, wage earners and the unemployment rate. Although we focused on a 
“real” analysis, studying growth we also referred to monetary variables, such as interest rates and 
inflation rate (provided by Ameco). 
In this regard, footnote_1 refers to this annex. Choosing a real growth index as constant prices GDP 
(i.e. "adjusted" by the effect of  inflation) we faced a substantial trouble: referring to R&D investments it 
could be argued that a quality/technology improvement of  goods – or by extension product innovations 
– we may actually justify ceteris paribus an increase in price, because such good could be considered 
upgraded. In addition to this, some authors believe that using constant prices labor productivity (on 
aggregate) could be tricky too, because it depends on deflators selection and computation. For example, 
new millennium trend in productivity was brought down by the choice of  deflators, which de facto would 
hide the structural change in the Italian economy towards higher quality goods, therefore less exposed to 
price-competitiveness [Birolo, 2010, p.60; Palumbo, 2013]. Furthermore, choosing productivity we did a 
quite strong hypothesis: we suppose that final goods – and their means of  production – should be 
regarded as all homogeneous goods [Birolo, 2010, p.50], or which may be deemed by discounting price 
effects [Ginzburg, 2012, p.77]. 
Despite these concerns, we decided to use labor productivity for the following reasons: I) obtaining 
disaggregated production values for all considered years could be very difficult, end needing other 
theoretical assessments;  II) we didn’t make comparative analysis with other countries, where product 
composition was critical to rate different performances; III) labor productivity is easily comparable with 
trend in real wages; IV) the analysis of  productivity is only part of  our research, which has as its main 
target the analysis of  the labor market. 
 
 
2) Labor productivity is expressed as: 
 	!"##"  	
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where: 
GVA = gross value added 
Lt = total employees 
 
However, in order to better clarify demand-factors influencing labor productivity, we decided to analyse it 
in the following way: 
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3) In order to calculate wages (for construction, to be considered as gross wages23) we solved the 
following equation: 
( 	)*		+ 		
&)
&'
 
where:  
W = total wages    
w-sh = adjusted wage share 
Ls = wage earners 
Lt = total employees 
GDP = gross domestic product at 2005 constant prices 
 
 
4) Referring to Ameco database we used time series about GDP - expenditure approach - shares 
(consumption, investment, government expenditure and trade balance); in particular, we calculated gross 
investment and gross investment per employee. Further elaborations result from simple ratios, 
differential growth rates or Pearson's correlations (ρ) between the other variables. 
 
 
  
                                                           
23 Gross wages do not consider changes in the “tax wedge” and then you cannot make further considerations about net wages and about 
the influence of  fiscal policy on income distribution. 
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